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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Supreme Court No.

v.

:

Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Appellant.

:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QVEgTIQN? PRESENTED
1.

Is scienter--the intent to defraud, deceive or

manipulate—an element of the crime of securities fraud under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21?
2.

Is expert testimony, concluding that an alleged

misrepresentation or omission is "material," inadmissible in a
prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61-11(2)?
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
issued on February 7, 1992.
Rep.

13 (2/7/92).

It was published at 180 Utah Adv.

A copy is attached as Appendix A.
JURISDICTION

A.

On February 7, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals

decision was filed.
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B.

No orders concerning a rehearing or extensions of

time within which to petition for certiorari have been requested
or made.
C.

Petitioner believes the respondent does not intend

to file a cross-petition.
D.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1:
It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21:
(1) A person who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter except Section 611-16, or who willfully violates any rule or
order under this chapter, or who willfully
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the
statement made to be false or misleading in
any material respect, shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.

-2g \wpl\188\00001aws.W51

(2) No person may be imprisoned for the
violation of any rule or order if he proves
that he had no knowledge of the rule or
order.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27:
This chapter may be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this chapter with the
related federal regulation.
17 C. F. R.

§ 240. 10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5" ):

It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.

-3g \wpl\188\00001aws W51

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves a securities fraud prosecution.
This petition raises a question of first impression in Utah:

Is

scienter--the intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive — an
element of the crime of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. §§
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21.

Under federal law on which these

provisions are patterned and with which Utah' s Act was intended
to harmonize, it is.

The Utah Court of Appeals says it is not.

The government charged Mr. Larsen with securities fraud
under these provisions, alleging that he misrepresented or
omitted material facts in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of securities.
Mr.

(Ct. App. Opinion p. 4, Appendix A).

Larsen requested the trial court to instruct the jury that an

intent to defraud is an element of the charges and that his good
faith is a defense.
Nos.

(Defendant' s Requested Jury Instructions

4-5, 30, attached as Appendix B).

(Appendix B).

This was refused.

The jury was instead told that it is sufficient to

convict a person for securities fraud in Utah simply if he or she
acts "willfully":

"When it is his conscious objective or desire

to engage in the conduct or cause a result. "

(Instructions to

the Jury, Nos. 14, 17 and 17A, Appendix C). 1

!

The trial court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause on
March 4, 1991. The court expressed concern that specific intent is
an added element of securities fraud with which Mr. Larsen was
charged. (Transcript of Proceedings, February 19, 1991, pp. 47-48,
Appendix D).
-4g \wpl\188\00001aws W51

This petition raises a second issue relating to the
permissible scope of expert opinion regarding the materiality of
alleged omissions in securities offering materials.

At trial,

the government was permitted, over objection, to present the
"expert" testimony of Sherman Cook that certain facts allegedly
not disclosed to investors were "material."
On June 20, 1990, the jury convicted Mr. Larsen.

On

February 7, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, rejecting the view that intent to defraud is an element of
a criminal violation of §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-27.
Opinion pp. 13-14, Appendix A).

(Ct. App.

The Court of Appeals also found

that the trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Cook' s
testimony.

(Ct. App. Opinion pp. 10-11, Appendix A).
The Utah Supreme Court should grant certiorari to

settle these important questions which greatly affect businesses
and investors, and the course of state securities fraud
prosecutions.

Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P.
ARGUMENT

A.

Intent to Defraud is an Element of a Criminal
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21

The Court of Appeals decision that intent to defraud is
not an element of a securities fraud violation under §§ 61-1-1(2)
and 61-1-21, directly collides with the interpretation of the
related federal provision on which Utah7 s Act was patterned and
with which Utah' s law was intended to harmonize.
-5g-\wpl\188\00001aws.W51
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A violation of

the related federal provision requires such intent ("scienter").
Utah' s law was intended to have the same interpretation, as we
explain below.

Discordantly, the Court of Appeals holding now

permits strict-liability conviction (with possible imprisonment),
as in this case, without proof that the accused was possessed of
a mental state embracing intent to defraud, manipulate or
deceive, and regardless of the accused' s good faith belief. (Ct.
App. Opinion pp. 13-14).
The language of § 61-1-1(2), construed, as it must be,
according to the meaning intended by Utah' s legislature and
Congress, and in harmony with United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the related federal provisions on which
§ 61-1-1 was patterned, plainly reveals that scienter is an
element of the offense.
1.

Legislative Intent and Federal Judicial
Construction

In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain
revisions unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform
Act").

This is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah

Act").

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-28.

Section 101 of the Uniform

Act (§ 61-1-1 of Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule X-10B-5 ("Rule
10b-5").

See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment,

reprinted in L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 6
(1976).

The language of the three classes of proscribed activity
-6-
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under § 61-1-1 and Federal Rule 10b-5 is identical.

Compare Utah

Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 17 C. F. R. § 240. 10b-5; pp. 2-3 supra.
Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5, criminal
penalties are set for any "willful" violation.2

Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-1-21; 15 U. S. C. § 78ff.
The Draftsmen' s Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act
explains that Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform
state fraud provision because of the language disparities in
existing state statutes and "fre<?»v?3of frhg gufrgt»riti»lfroflyof
judicial precedent which has been developed under the federal
provisions."

L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 7

(1976) (emphasis supplied).

This comment reveals also that the

Draftsmen anticipated that § 101, as adopted by the states, would
be construed in harmony with federal court interpretation of Rule
10b-5.
Utah7 s legislature expressed synonymous intent.

Aware

of the Utah Act' s federal origin, Utah' s legislature declared
that the Act was intended not only to encourage uniformity among
the states, but "to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation. "

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis supplied).

The

^Mr. Larsen does not challenge the trial court' s instruction
on "willfulness. " (Instruction No. 17, Appendix C). Willfulness
is also an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court erred
by refusing to instruct that scienter was a separate, additional
element of the offence. See pp. 8-13 infra.
-7g: \wpl\188\00001aws.W51
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Utah Act must be construed to effectuate this "general purpose."

14.
2.

Scienter is Required to Violate Rule 10b-5

The federal regulation "related" to § 61-1-1 is Rule
10b-5.

See p. 7 supra.

Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC

under authority of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,

15 U. S. C.

§ 78j(b) (the "1934 Act"), 3 which proscribes

"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
contravention of SEC rules.
U.S.

See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

184, 194, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976).

There is "no indication that any type of criminal or civil
liability is to attach [under § 10(b)] in the absence of
scienter"--the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
U.S.

at 193 n. 12, 205, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n. 12,

supplied).
1945,

425

1387 (emphasis

See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 713, 100 S. Ct.

1964, 64 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1980) (Blackmun concurring and

dissenting).
state.

Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) require the same mental

Hochfelder. 425 U.S. at 212-14, 96 S. Ct. at 1390-91.

See also Dirks v. SEC. 463 U. S. 646, 663, n. 23,
3266 n. 23,

103 S. Ct. 3255,

77 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983) (in criminal prosecution,

3

Section 10(b) was originally concerned solely with criminal
prosecutions but later became the basis for a judicially-implied
private cause of action.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1922, 44 L. Ed. 2d 539,
546 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 184, 196, 96 S.
Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976).
-8o \wnl\188\00001aws.W51

" [sJcienter--' a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud, ' [citation omitted]--is an independent
element of a Rule 10b-5 violation"), citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 193-94 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n. 12 (scienter required in
civil 10b-5 action).
at 1955.

See also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695, 100 S. Ct.

This is "the interpretation" of § 61-1-1's "related

federal regulation" contemplated by the Utah legislature.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
Thus, while the language of Rule 10b-5 (b) & (c), like
Utah's § 61-1-1(2) & (3), viewed in isolation, could be read to
apply to any type of material misstatement or omission,
intentional or not (the apparent basis of the Utah Court of
Appeals' holding), "such a reading cannot be harmonized with the
administrative history of the rule. "
212, 96 S. Ct. at 1390.

Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at

"In the absence of a conflict between

reasonably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of
the statute must prevail."
1957.

Aaron, 446 U. S. at 700, 100 S. Ct. at

The Utah legislature intended that § 61-1-1 would be

s i mi1arly cons trued.
3,

gQQfl Ffrifrh j§ 3 Defengg

Hand-in-hand with the scienter element is the
consistent notion that good faith is a defense under Utah' s § 611-1 and Rule 10b-5.

Construing Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the

1934 Act, the Hochfelder Court explained that "[t]here is no

-9g \wpl\188\0000iaws W51
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indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for
[manipulative, deceptive or illicit] practices unless he acted
other than in good faith."

425 U.S. at 206, 96 S. Ct. at 1387.

The scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith
error.
n. 11.
144,

Dirks. 463 U.S. at 674-75 n. 11,

103 S. Ct. at 3271-72

See also State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P. 2d
152 (1981), af f' d 230 Kan. 296, 640 P. 2d 1198 (1982).
The thorough, reasoned decisions of the United States

Supreme Court are persuasive here as Utah' s legislature intended:
Where a state statute is patterned after a federal
statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts, interpreting the
parent federal statute, are, even though they were
hjinflefl flown »ft$r tfre gtfloptiQn fry frhQ 9 W 9 Q$ t*iQ
federal statute, most persuasive, particularly where
such interpretations are the only ones extant with
respect to the disputed words of the state statute.
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 335 (1974) (emphasis supplied).

See

also Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P. 2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) (" [t]he
primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was
meant to achieve"); State v. Tavlor, 82 Ariz. 289, 312 P. 2d 162,
165-66 (1957) (subsequent interpretation of federal statute was
entitled to "great weight" in construing state statute); Geraahtv
v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle. 8 Wash. 2d 437, 112 P. 2d
846,

849 (1941); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
Other states have correctly applied these principles in

construing their version of § 61-1-1.
-10g \wpl\188\00001aws W51

See Puckett. 634 P. 2d at

154,

(citing Hochfelder and acknowledging scienter requirement);

People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P. 2d 363, 365-66
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (acknowledging scienter is an element, the
court concluded:

"we look to Federal court interpretation of

Rule 10b-5 and the nature of the intent required to sustain a
violation of the rule").
Several states, however, have failed to acknowledge (or
were perhaps unaware of) 4 the federal origin and meaning of the
Uniform Securities Act and its intent to harmonize state and
federal regulation.

The government urges these decisions which

would permit sweeping, strict-liability prosecutions.
Brief p. 36, Appendix E).

(State

As we will show on appeal, these

opinions are ill-advised and often inaccurate.5

Yet, like those

courts, the Court of Appeals, focusing solely on the language of
§ 61-1-21 and on Mr. Larsen' s use of the now-outmoded phrase
"specific intent" in his description of the scienter element,
overlooks the controlling rule; neither the Court of Appeals nor

4

See, e. a. . People v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 279 N. W. 2d 579
(1979) (Hochfelder and its progeny not mentioned).
5

£§£, e. g. , State v. Temby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N. W. 2d 522,
525-27 (1982); (State Brief p. 36). Inexplicably, the Tembv court
cites Aaron for the proposition that intent to defraud is not an
element under "the federal statute dealing with fraudulent
securities transactions". 322 N. W. 2d at 526 (emphasis supplied).
The Temby court, apparently unaware of the other federal statutes
dealing with fraudulent securities transactions, ignores the Aaron
Court' s holding that Rule 10b-5, the model for the provision at
issue in Temby, and here, requires scienter. Aaron 446 U. S. at
591, 100 S. Ct. at 1952-53.
-11g \wpl\188\00001aws W51

the government, mention, yet alone analyze, Hochfelder and its
reasoned progeny.
34-36).

(Ct. App. Opinion pp. 13-14, State Brief pp.

The decision instead drives a wedge between the state's

law and its federal model, sowing regulatory discord among states
and new uncertainty among businesses and investors.

See

McWilliams, Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Juris
Prudence Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S. C. L. Rev. 243,
245 (1987).

In so doing, the Court of Appeals directly collides

with Utah's legislative intent "to coordinate the interpretation"
of the Utah Act with the "related federal regulation."
Ann.

§ 61-1-27.

Utah Code

Here, the regulation "related" to § 61-1-1 is

Federal Rule 10b-5 which includes the element of scienter.
In view of the above, it is apparent that the Court of
Appeals' holding -- that no greater mental state than "willful"
is required in Utah to violate § 61-1-1 -- is incorrect.

The

state provisions must not be read in isolation, as the Court of
Appeals implies, but in connection with legislative history and
federal precedent, as Utah' s legislature intended.

Compare

Aaron, 446 U. S. at 700, 100 S. Ct. at 1957 (only in the absence
of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning and legislative
history will the words of the statute prevail).

Like Rule lOb-5,

Utah's § 61-1-1 must be construed in harmony with its legislative
and administrative genesis, "a history making clear that when the
Commission adopted the Rule, it was intended to apply only to

-12g \wpl\188\00001aws.W51

activities that involved scienter. "

Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at 212,

96 S. Ct. at 1390.
The trial court' s refusal to instruct the jury
concerning this element of the offenses charged under § 61-1-1,
as Mr. Larsen requested, is reversible error as a matter of law.
State v. Jones, 177 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3-4 (S. C. 1/14/92).

This

failure, which constitutes a violation of due process (see
Carella v. California. 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2420
(1989); State v. Scott. 110 Wash. 2d 682, 757 P. 2d 492, 496
(1988) (en banc)), "can never be harmless error".
Rep.

at 4.

177 Utah Adv.

Certiorari should be granted.
B.

Expert Qpinipn Testimony Relying TQ The L^gal
Standard of Materiality Under Utah Code Ann. 3 611-1 ig Impyopey

Another question of first impression raised here
involves the permissible scope of opinion evidence by experts on
issues of law and legal standards in the context of securities
claims.
The trial court permitted Sherwood Cook to testify,
over objection6 whether in his expert opinion certain alleged
omissions by Mr. Larsen (presented in oversimplified hypothetical

5

Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Larsen also submitted a
motion in limine to preclude the government from presenting opinion
testimony from "securities experts" regarding whether certain
representations
or omissions met the legal standard of
"materiality" for purposes of a securities fraud prosecution under
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The trial court did not rule.
-13g:\wpl\188\00001aws.W51
03/09/92

form) would be "material."

(Ct. App. Opinion ?. 8). Mr. Cook

was presented to the jury as an attorney admitted to practice in
both Utah and Nevada, a former securities regulation official for
the state of Utah and the top Securities Administrator for
Nevada — someone "familiar with both the state and federal
requirements of disclosure in limited offerings. "
vol. VI, R-1612, p. 42 11. 9-15, Appendix D).

(Transcript

Cook was permitted

in essence to opine that certain facts Mr. Larsen omitted from
securities registrations were "material."

The effect was to

permit Cook to render his expert opinion that Mr. Larsen was
guilty.

(Transcript pp. 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89, 90, 90-91, 93,

Appendix D). 7 Even the government candidly described this issue
as "a close one."

(State Brief p. 33).

The Utah Court of Appeals, citing United States v.
Leuben, 812 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1987), ruled that Cook's testimony
was permissible because it went to "an ultimate issue of fact."
(Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). 8
While the Appeals Court duly recited the standard for
admissible opinion set forth in Davidson v. Prince, 813 P. 2d
1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), it misapplied Leuben, misconstrued the

Cook even testified, over objection, regarding another
investigation he supervised of Mr. Larsen and others involving a
transaction which took place prior to the events giving rise to
this case. Transcript pp. 47-52, Appendix D).
8

One member of the panel of the Court of Appeals declined to
join in this section of the opinion. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 15).
-14g \wpl\188\00001aws W51

intent of Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence and disregarded
judicial precedent analyzing the unique problems involved in
defining the appropriate scope of expert testimony in securities
fraud cases.

This body of caselaw confirms what the transcript

plainly reveals, the testimony of Sherwood Cook was improper and
highly prejudicial.
(6th Cir. 1984).

See United States v. Zipkin, 729 F. 2d 384

The Court should grant certiorari to determine

whether a separate standard for expert opinion is appropriate in
the context of securities claims, and to elucidate the
appropriate standard to be applied to "experts" who testify as to
the force and effect of law.
1.

D e c i s i o n s A n a l y z i n g E x p e r t Opinion Testimony
i n g e g y y j U e S Fy»yujL AgtJQQg CQirtrQl, Ngi;
L$yl?en

Several important decisions involving securities fraud
address the issue raised here.

These include Scop v. United

States, 846 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988) and Matthews v. Ashland
Chemicals, Inc. . 770 F. 2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
particularly relevant.

Scop is

The defendant in Scop was convicted of

federal securities fraud.

At trial, the government offered

opinion evidence through an SEC official whom it offered as an
expert witness.

The opinions of the witness, taken as a whole,

were in essence that the defendant' s actions constituted
"manipulation" and "fraud."

Scop. 846 F. 2d at 138.

The Scop

court found that use of statutory language to state the opinion

-15g \wpl\188\00001aws W51
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of the witness constitutes a legal conclusion which is improper
and should be excluded:
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified that
controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here
can create artificial price levels to lure outside
investors, no sustainable objection could have been
made. Instead Whitten made no attempt to couch the
opinion testimony in even conclusory factual statements
but drew directly on the language of the statute and
accompanying regulations concerning "manipulation" and
"fraud." In essence, his opinions were legal
conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well
beyond his province as an expert in securities trading.
Id. at 140.

This was compounded with the problem, as the Scop

court noted, that statutory terms like "manipulation" and "scheme
to defraud" are not self-defining, but have been the subject of
diverse judicial interpretation.

£&.

Other securities cases note the problems associated
with use of "securities experts'" testimony regarding legal
standards.

The seminal case is Marx & Co. . Inc. v. Diner7 s Club,

Inc. , 550 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434 U.S. 861
(1977).

In Marx, a "securities expert" rendered testimony as to

what he thought the term "best efforts" meant in a contract, and
whether or not the defendants in that case had used "best
efforts. "

l£i. at 509.

The expert testified that failure to

issue a registration statement within 70 days was proof that the
defendants failed to use "best efforts."

This testimony

constituted an opinion as to the "reasonableness" of delay in
registration.

Id. at 511.

The court noted that securities fraud

-16g:\wpl\188\00001aws.W51

litigation presents a special danger of abuse of expert witness
testimony:

"With the growth of intricate securities litigation .

. . we must be especially careful not to allow trials before
juries to become battles of paid advocates posing as experts on
the respective sides concerning matters of domestic law. "
F. 2d at 511.

550

See also Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co. . 807 F. 2d

359 (4th Cir. 1986) (testimony of legal experts in securities
fraud cases presents significant conceptual problems which reach
beyond securities issues).9

The analysis in Scop and other

securities fraud cases, not Leuben, applies here.

Like the term

"manipulation," "materiality" is not a self-defining term, and
Cook' s testimony was couched in statutory terms. 10
The Court of Appeals disregarded this precedent, (Ct.
App.

Opinion, p. 10 n. 9), and relied instead on United States v.

9

Both Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often, as
here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let alone
the juror's minds.
10

The Court of Appeals averted this issue by making the
remarkable comment that it believed Cook used the term "material"
in a "factual" way.
(Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). In light of the
court7 s holding that materiality is an element of the offense
charged and the undue deference the jury would accord to Mr. Cook,
the "expert," and the confusion attendant to this hairsplitting
distinction, the court' s conclusion cannot withstand scrutiny.
Further, in making that comment, the court must implicitly admit
that the term "material" must in some cases at least constitute a
legal conclusion.
This exchange highlights one of the many
inherent difficulties in permitting experts in securities cases to
testify as to what does and does not meet statutory and regulatory
standards.
-17g-\wpl\188\00001aws.W51
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Leuben.

Unlike Matthews and SCOP. Leuben was not a securities

fraud case and did not even involve actual testimony; the holding
was that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the
government to put on expert testimony on the issue of materiality
but excluding similar testimony by the defense.
at 184.

Leuben, 812 F. 2d

Further, the Leuben court noted that the parties had

already assumed that for a claim under 18 U.S. C. § 1001 the issue
of materiality was an issue of fact, while for a claim under 18
U. S. C. § 1004 it was a question of law.

!£. at 183 n. 3.

The

court concluded that it need not decide whether these assumptions
were correct apparently because its decision did not turn on that
distinction. Ij|.
Attempting to apply Leuben in this very different
securities fraud case, the Court of Appeals seems to read Rule
704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it goes to an
issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is not a legal
conclusion.

(Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). This approach is

inadequate and stands Rule 704 on its head.

Under Rule 704,

evidence is not admissible because it goes to an ultimate fact;
rather it cannot be excluded only because it goes to an issue of
ultimate fact.

The testimony may be inadmissible for other

reasons, where, as here, an opinion embodies a legal conclusion
(even if the same testimony relates to an "ultimate fact").

-18g:\wpl\188\00001aws.W51
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The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling
problem created by the ultimate fact rule.

Yet, the approach of

the Court of Appeals is to replace it with just another label.
To say that an issue is one of ultimate fact and not a legal
opinion simply states the result and does nothing to clarify the
basis for this determination.

"Materiality" in the context of a

securities fraud claim cannot be neatly labelled as a legal or a
fact issue; it is a conclusion reached by applying an objective
legal standard to a set of facts.

The appropriate analysis

should thus focus not on simplistic labelling of an expert' s
opinion as fact or law, but on whether the expert improperly
supplants the judge as law giver and jury instructor or whether,
as we explain below, he or she provides "opinions phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. "

846 F. 2d at 140.

The principle problem with Cook' s testimony is not that
he gave evidence of the factual predicate for materiality; the
error occurred when he was permitted in effect to instruct the
jury that in his opinion the facts presented by the government
meet the legal standard of materiality.

(Transcript Vol. VI pp.

86, 89, 91). Cook's testimony evidences the prejudice that
results when these rules are misapplied:
Q:

And if there is a change that the seller realizes
later on after he has used the document disclosing
the investment manager will function, what is the
proper way of dealing with that?

Mr. Keller:

Objection, 702.
-19-
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Court:
A:

Overruled.

Investor should be informed of that change and
given a chance to get out of the investment.

Besides the obvious problem that Mr. Cook was permitted
to give his opinion as to what the law requires, there is the
additional problem that what he said is at least incomplete and
misleading, if not wrong.

The above question in effect asks Mr.

Cook if, in his opinion, an offeror has a legal duty to correct
or update offering materials.

It is unclear whether the question

is limited to the offering period or whether the obligation is
absolute and continuing.

While no Utah authority appears on this

issue, under federal securities law the duty to update or correct
is highly fact and time sensitive.

See, e. g. , Ross v. A. H.

Robbins Co. , Inc. . 465 F. Supp. 904 (S. D. N. Y. 1979), rev' d on
other grounds 607 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied 446 U.S.
946.
The above exchange reveals that Mr. Cook stated a broad
legal standard without qualification.

This kind of testimony not

only constitutes a legal conclusion, but because its correctness
depends on facts not presented (by the evidence or
hypothetically), it is equally excludable as an opinion "phrased
in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. "
F. 2d at 140.

Scop, 846

This defect cannot be corrected simply by

permitting cross-examination, rebuttal, or a corrective
instruction.

See, e. g. , United States v. Zipkin, 729 F. 2d 384
-20-
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(6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy judge as to effect of
order he entered in bankruptcy proceedings and availability of
interim fees not curable by cross to demonstrate error as to
law).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should grant
certiorari and settle these two important questions.
DATED this 9th day of March, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John T. Nielsen
David L. Arrington
Joel G. Momberger
Jon E. Waddoups
Melyssa D. Davidson
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
LARRY R. KELLER
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
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BENCH, Presiding Judge:
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of
securities fraud and theft on the ground that the Office of the
Utah Attorney General (the Attorney General) should have been
disqualified from the case for a conflict of interest. Larsen
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was
prompted by disclosure of confidential information from his
attorney, and constituted an etnical violation. Larsen also
challenges the admissibility cf opinion testimony by the State's
expert, the court's failure to prombit certain evidence, and its
refusal to give certain ^ury instructions. We affirm.

In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen
served as president cf Granada, a closely held corporation owned
by him and memners of his family. According to Larsen, Granada
was "inactive*" during the first few years after incorporation,

development- The projects ranged from housing developments and
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were
also very successful.
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a
different general partner was named. In all, close to one
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a
recently licensed attorney.
Larsen claims he nired Farr as his own personal attorney to
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorneyclient relationship. Although Larsen disputes that Farr was ever
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal matters
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a
parking violation by an office vehicle, pro bono litigation, a
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated family
partnership as new family memoers were born. Larsen further
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions
and a health plan.
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working
"relationship." Farr reported the hours he worked to Larsen, who
then billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account in tne name
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr
relationship lasted approximately four years.

1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were
involved in the forty-two count amended information.

Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients.
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use
Professional Pension Services (PPS), an entity that Larsen said
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to
Granada-related projects.
Farr claimed that Larsen failed, m recommending PPS, to
disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients'
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at
the request of the clients for information about the liquid
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the loans.
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were
widespread.
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be
resolved. Despite tnese assurances, notning was done. Farr
continued to press Larsen for a resolution and even volunteered
to handle the matter. Larsen rejected tne offer, and hired
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state
securities laws. As a result of the growing tension between
Larsen and Farr, their worx relationsnip was severed in 1932.*
Following the breaKup, Farr continued to be concerned acout
the interests of former "clients,'* especially their investments
in Granada. As a result of what he perceived to be ongoing
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White of the Utah
Securities Division (Securities Division; m 1933. Farr told
2. Larsen claims that
reason for the breakup
to the Utah Securities
view of Larsen's claim
any meaningful sense.

Farr's failure to make partner was the
as well as his motive in reporting Larsen
Division, a rather telling statement m
that Farr was never even an associate m

White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986,
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division.
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada.
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February
1987.
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing.
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF).
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division,
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing
in which Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court
denied the motion.
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed
an interlocutory appeal, both of which were denied. Before
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also
moved to prohibit inquiry into the investigation by the
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF.
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a
jury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts.

II.
A.

DISQUALIFICATION

Attorney-Client Relationship

Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorneyclient relationship existed. C£. Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d
387, 839 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few
minor transactional natters unrelated to securities or the
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen's
motion to disqualify.
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact.11 Saunders v. Sharp, 306 P.2d 198,
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law m the case." Id. at 199.
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional
relationship,3 but admits he "may have fallen somewhat short" in
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal:
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law;
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work: for Larsen
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution;
(4) that Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a
(continued..T)

marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical
adherence to form over substance. "A reviewing court is entitled
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishopr 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Oosahl. 92 111.
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. Westside Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App.
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record
in search of supporting factual matters).
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his]
position,11 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991), without presenting any of the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to
meet the marshaling burden [he] must carry." Ld. Because Larsen
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters
unrelated to this prosecution.5
3. (...continued)
few minor matters; (3) that the work was unrelated to the matters
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's
representation ceased prior to 1983.
4. Larsen was allowed to file an cverlength brief of 81 pages
after his request to file a 120-page brief was denied. The 81page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous.
5. Larsen asserts that it was his suo^ective belief that Farr
was his personal attorney in all things, out fails to present any
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client
relationship. See, e.g., Maraulies v. Unchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985) (an attorney-client relationship was implied
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which
the would-be clients had invested); 3reuer-Harrison, Inc. v.
(continued...]

B.

Substantial Factual Relationship Test

Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows
(with our emphasis):
When a lawyer becomes associated with a
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a
person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in which that
lawyer, or firm with which the lawyer has
associated, had previously represented a
client whose interests are materially adverse
to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Whether the matters m which Farr represented Larsen were
"the same or substantially factually related" to the current case
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal
charges against him.
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the
same or substantially related to the matters for which
disqualification is new sought. Unless a substantial factual
relationship is shown between the matters, disqualification is
not required under the rule cecause the most basic element is not
present. Our conclusion that there is no substantial
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the
perceived securities problems outside the scope of the legal
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr
5. (...continued)
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990) (although an
attorney-client relationship may be implied by the parties'
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the
attorney's conduct). C£. Atkinson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 798 P.2d
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to
have represented as shown by the pleadings and other documents;
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement;
and the parties' admissions about the relationship)".

confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel.
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent
employment with the Attorney General. Maroulies v. Upchurch P 696
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, we conclude that,
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel.
Id.
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his
conviction.
In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990),
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. Id, at
400.
If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id.

III.

EXPERT OPINION

Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony.
Whether or not
the information was "material" is an element of securities
fraud. 6

6.

It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not
misleading; or
(continued...)

It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State
v. Clavton. 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah
1974) . Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue . . • ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart,
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982).
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. KerrMcGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B.
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein' s Evidence. \ 704[02].
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987) (attorney's
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[tjhere is no
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and

6.

(. . .continued)

(3) engage in any act,
practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989):
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an
ultimate issue as "[tjhat question which must finally be answered
as, for= example, the defendant's negligence is the .ultimate issue
in a personal injury action."

those that call for overbroad legal responses,"
P.2d at 1231. 8

Davidson, 813

The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben. the Fifth Circuit held that
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being factoriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false
statements would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan
officer as a factual element of the government's case was
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were
legally "material." Z£. at 184. The government was required to
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court,
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185.
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns,
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in
the cases cited by Larsen.' Accordingly, we are persuaded by
Lueben that use of the terra "material" may be admitted as
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record,
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material"
in a factual sense.
8. See State v. Span, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah
1991) (arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273
(Utah App. 1988) (expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis
v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in
failing to adequately train his deputies, and that there was a
causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs's injuries);
United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was
factual and not a legal conclusion).
9. See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988);
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d-~505 (2nd Cir.
1977) .

Since the State is required to prove all essential elements
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the
expert testimony- See State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element).
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the
casual use of the term "material'1 and its legal definition could
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel
Tech. Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz,
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989).
IV.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE
A.

EFF Fund

Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial. 10 The
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their
structural similarity.
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but
that these documents were only partially completed or nonexistent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court
denied Larsen's motion, stating that the government was entitled
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial.
"Relevant evidence'1 is defined as that "evidence having a
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable11 and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401
10. In particular, Larsen objected to the State's inquiries into
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund,
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which
properties received monies from EFF.

and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah
1986) . Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added)• Thus, in determining whether
relevant evidence should be excluded, "[ejvidence that tends to
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not
admissible." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1989) .
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990).
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities.
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as
the trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to
the EFF Fund.
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
B,

Investigation by the Securities Division

Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division,
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial."
-Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

11

[I]n order to preserve a contention of
error in the admission of evidence for
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely
objection to the trial court in clear and
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or
specific objection on the basis of character
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific
ground for objection [is] not clear from the
context of the question or the testimony, the
theory cannot be raised on appeal."
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)(footnote
omitted).
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made.
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form,
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403.
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality,
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from
the context. See State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah),
cert, denied,
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder. 726
P.2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the
issue further.
V,
A.

REMAINING ISSUES
Specific Intent

Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis
in the evidence to support that theory, jury instructions should
not incorrectly or misleadingly state the law. State v. Aly, 782
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)).
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent"
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990).
The Utah Code specifies willfulness as the culpable mental
state for securities fraud. "Any person who willfully violates

any provision of this chapter . . • or willfully violates any
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the jury
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud
is "willfulness,M rather than specific intent as proposed by
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows:
You are instructed that a person engages in
conduct intentionally or with intent or
willfully, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976)
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 611-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud). Tnasmuch as willfulness is the culpable
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was
unnecessary.
B.

Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions

We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not
address them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 883
(Utah 1989).
VI.

CONCLUSION

Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is
willfulness and the-trial court's instruction on the element was
proper.

^Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed,

Russell w. Bench,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:
>4J^
Norman H. Jackson, fjudqe

I CONCUR IN PARTS 11(A), IV(B), V(A), AND V(B), AND OTHERWISE
CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT:

GregoiyrK. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OO0OO

STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Case No. 891900927
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
ooOoo

Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
C. Dean Larsen, by and through his counsel of record,

hereby

requests that the following jury instructions be given by the Court
in this case.
Further, the Defendant requests leave to offer such other
additional instructions as, during the course of the trial, become
appropriate.
1.

The Court's usual instructions on the following subjects:
a.

Verdict/Jury's responsibility.

b.

Province of the court.

c.

Province of the jury.

COirr?

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The crimes charged in this case are serious crimes which
require proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be
convicted.

Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than

the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant willfully did an act which the law forbids, or willfully
failed to do an act which the law requires, purposely intending to
violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case.

^

•• A , /)

W

1

U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21.

2

1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
§ 14.03 (3d ed. 1977).

3

Troutman v. U.S., 100 F.2d 628, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1939).

4

Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).

5

Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert.denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).

6

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).

7

U.S. v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1976).

8

Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 422-23, 433-34 (1985).

9

State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976).

10

State v. Haas, 675 P.2d 673, 678 (Ariz. 1983).

11

U.S. v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978).

12

U.S. v. Payne, 474 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1973).

r'M -> — o

13

U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 588 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed
Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960).

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Under Utah law, a person engages in conduct "willfully" with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
Thus, an act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and
intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids; that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law.
An omission or a failure to act is done "willfully" if done
voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to fail
to do something the law requires; that is to say with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law.

.

In this case, the bad purpose would be the specific intent %6 \fc
defraud

1

U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1).

2

1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice ^Instructions,
§ 14.06 (3d ed. 1977).

3

See citations from previous requested Instruction No. 4.

4

U.S. v. A. & P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).

5

Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250, 252, 264 (1952).

6

Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 101-107 (1945).

7

Hartzel v. U.S., 322 U.S. 680, 686 (1944).

8

U.S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-243 (1939).

9

Murdock v. U.S., 290 U.S. 389, 393-396 (1933).

10

Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 429 (1932).

OC-l.'.-rO

11

Ellis v. U.S., 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1906).

12

Marteney v. U.S., 218 F.2d 258, 263
cert.denied 348 U.S. 953 (1955).

(10th Cir. 1954),

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of SECURITIES FRAUD, as alleged in Count

11

of the Information, you must

find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that crime:
1.

That the Defendant willfully made an untrue statement of

a material fact; or
2.

That the Defendant willfully omitted to state a material

fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and
3.

That any such statements or omissions by the Defendant

were in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security,
directly or indirectly; and
4.

That any such statements or omissions by the Defendant

were made or omitted with the specific intent to defraud Anthony
Middleton, Jr.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty
to find the Defendant guilty of SECURITIES FRAUD.
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish
each and all of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty to find the Defendant not guilty of SECURITIES
FRAUD.

INSTRUCTION NO. 30
You are instructed that a representation made by the Defendant
in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of
Securities Fraud. Thus, the Defendant is not guilty of Securities
Fraud if he had a good faith intention to carry out a promise or
representation at the time he made the promise or representation.
Even if the representation were false or based purely upon speculation and caused an investor to rely upon the representation as
true, it does not constitute Securities Fraud if the Defendant made
the representation in good faith.
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or state of mind
denoting honesty of purpose, or freedom from intention to defraud.
If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable
doubt whether the Defendant made a representation in good faith,
then you should find the Defendant not guilty of Securities Fraud
in regard to that representation.

1

Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).

2

U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir, 1988).

3

Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1955).

4

U.S. v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1978).

5

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).
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IN THE DISTRICT LUURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIhTRiCi
i.\ A\D YUU SALT LAKE COLXIY. STATE OF ITAH

THE S1ATE OF ITAH.
Plaintiff,
vs .

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JLRY

C. DEAN LARSEN.

CRIMINAL NO. 891900927

Defendant:.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

\ou are
charged by

instructed that
the Information

commission of

the defendant
which has

C. DEAN LARSEN

been duly

SECURITIES FRAUD (18 COUNTS)

.

is

filed with the
The Information

alleges:
COLNT 1
SECURITIES FRAUD. On or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake
Countv, Utah and in violation of Utah Code Ann., bection bl-11(2) and 61-1-21, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, in connection
with the offer or sale of any security to Carles Flamand,
directly or indirectly, willfullv made an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessarv m
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the
circumstances under which thev are made, not misleading.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are

instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah

a person commits securities fraud,
otfer or

if,

in

connection

with the

sale of any security, either directly or indirectly, he

willfully makes or causes to be
material

W

fact

or

omits

to

made any

untrue statement

of a

state a material fact necessary in

order to make the statements made, in light

of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading.

r>/>^ ^/^o

INSTRUCTION NO.

'/

You are instructed that a person engages in conduct
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.

r> r* i "

x

o

I N S T R U T I ' J N NO

You are
disproves

the

instructed that
culpable

.HA

ignorance or mistake of fact which

mental

state

is

a

defense

to

anv

prosecution for that crime.
The culpable
is "willfulness."

mental state for the crime of securities fraud
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1

Q

2

Did you also touch upon disclosures with regard

to limited offerings or private placements?

3

A

Yes, various aspects of those.

For the most

4

part, limited offerings, the disclosure in a limited

5

offering, is established by me and the SEC in their

6

guidelines and regulations. There are gaps in those

7

disclosure requirements, and that is where the committee

8

established some rules.

9

Q

Do you feel that you are familiar with both the

10

state and the federal requirements of disclosure in

11

limited offerings?

12

J

A

Yes, because we were examiners, we were

13

required to keep one eye on federal requirements and

14

another eye on the state requirements.

15

J

16

J American Securities Administration Association, let me

17

I ask you how long you have been associated with that

18

I organization.

19

A

20

I Utah in 1982.

21

J

22

J have had in the course of these eight years that helped

23

Q

Q

What securities —

Before we leave the North

Since working with Utah.

So I started with

It has been eight years.

What seminars or special training might you

you in your employment?

24

J

A

Number of seminars.

25

I seminars during the year.

The SEC sponsors several

The North American Securities
42

compilation of the disclosure that will go to an
investor.

That disclosure should be everything the

investor really should know or would consider important
in order to make an investment decision.
Q

And were you responsible to your employer to

determine the adequacy of those disclosure documents that
you reviewed?
A

Yes.

Q

And what are the types of things that you would

look for in your examination of prospectuses or Private
Placement Memorandums?
A

There is some basic disclosure that is required

under state requirements and the federal requirements.
There needs to be a disclosure about the owners, the
people that are putting the things together, that are
going to be running the business-

You need to disclose

what their background is, what their qualifications are,
what problems they may have had in the past.
Q

Why is that important?

A

Well, because your investment decision is —

it

is important because the people that are going to be
running the operation are the people that are pretty much
going to dictate the success or failure of the operation.
So you need to know about those people.
Q

What else are you concerned with when you

45

then a Certificate of Probable Cause should issue.
Because if a question is close enough, it would be
inherently unfair in our democratic society for someone
to be imprisoned for months and months and months, some
cases years, I suppose, for some Appellate Courts to deal
with problems.

We don't have that problem, fortunately,

in the State of Utah.

But nevertheless, that is a matter

that we have great concern about.

I believe that all

things considered, all of the points brought up, but
particularly the fact that this is a brand new statute,
and the statute, the main charging statute itself is not
very —

it is not very clear because it does not state

whether one should intentionally or willfully make the
statement but then confuses it by later on saying "The
punishment will be for one who willfully does it.M

It

sets forth what the penalty will be.
Now, I do not believe —

I believe I followed

the State and 61-1-1 and combined it with 61-1-21 to find
willfulness and I think that is the correct
interpretation.

But there is an argument that could be

made, that since the charging statute itself mentioned
nothing, it should have been specific intent.

And that

aloner over this past weekend, has given me my greatest
concern.

And I feel that in all fairness that it is a

matter that must be resolved by the Appellate Court and

47

therefore I am going to grant the Petition for
Certificate of Probable Cause.
I grant the Certificate of Probable Cause,
which brings us to the next point of —

that is only part

of the battle won as far as the state is concerned.

Now,

the question is, is he a security risk and should there
be bail and, if so, how much?
MR. KELLER:

May I address that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You want to do it at this time, you
may proceed.
MR. KELLER:

Very good, Your Honor. Your

Honor, Mr. Larsen came to me in August of 1988. At that
time the Attorney General's Office investigation had been
several months, even years in occurrence, and asked me to
represent him.

He was charged October 19th of 1988. He

has made every single court appearance he has ever been
requested to make. He has been on Pretrial Release
through Pretrial Services and has never had a problem.
He has been trusted and he has discharged that trust
faithfully.

He is a family man with eight children,

lived in Utah all of his life. He is a very religious
man.

His family has been very supportive of him.

There

would be absolutely no reason in the world for him to
change a course of conduct that he has undergone for the
last two and a half years.
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1

I the division if there is problems with the filings and it

2

is not accepted.

The division, if problems are

3

discovered, we then prepare a deficiency letter, as it is

4

I called, and submit it to the correspondent.

5

J

6
7

Q

page in the document and can you explain to the jury what
J that document is.

8
9

A

This is the cover page of this prospectus.

The

I prospectus again is the document that is supposed to

10
11

Now, turn, if you would please, to the fourth

contain all of the material disclosures that is intended
J to go to investors.

12

Q

How large was the prospectus, do you remember?

A

Well, the prospectus, including exhibits,

13

I

14

J actually was a couple of binders.

15

I

16

J determines what should be disclosed in the prospectus

17

J side to be used in connection with the sale of securities

18

Q

Briefly, will you explain, if you would, what

side?

19

I

A

In determining disclosures, there are specific

20

I guidelines for what needs to be disclosed in every

21

I offering and those are further established by state law

22

J and, of course, federal law.

23

J guidelines, the person reviewing the registration

24

J statement or prospectus would have to make a judgment

25

I call as to whether or not under the circumstances

Beyond those established
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additional disclosures need to be made.
Q

And do these disclosures vary from offering to

offering?
A

Yes.

Q

What is the standard if a new angle comes up,

how do you determine whether or not that is disclosed in
the prospectus?
A

Well, again, you would look for any kind of

guidelines that may establish a precedent and then you
just very carefully look at the operation and you
determine whether or not there is a specific piece of
information that an investor would consider important in
making a decision.

And then if you determine that there

is some information, then you insist it be disclosed.
Q

What is the intended use of the prospectus?

Who gets the prospectus?
A

The investor is supposed to receive the

prospectus.

This is all the representations or this is

suppose to contain all of the representations that the
investor should receive and should be relied on in making
an investment decision.
Q

So this document would contain those important

facts that you talked about earlier an investor should
know?
A

Yes, it should contain all of the material
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memorandum to sell interest in EFF, Ltd. once the seller
knew that such notes did not exist?
MR. KELLER:
Honor.

Objection, it is leading, Your

Secondly, under Rule 702 it is not a subject

normally necessary for expert testimony.

As I previously

argued to the Court, it is inappropriate to ask such
question.

The jury can read the information and make its

own conclusion.
THE COURT:

Overruled, the witness may answer.

That may be answered yes or no, whether you have an
opinion.
THE WITNESS:
Q

Would you ask the question again?

(By Mr. Griffin) Yes.

If promissory notes

never existed as represented in the Private Placement
Memorandum, do you have an opinion as to whether or not
it would be appropriate or proper to use this document in
selling investments in EFF, Ltd. once the seller knew
that notes didn't exist?
A

It would not be proper.

Q

If this memorandum were used to make initial

sales to investors and then subsequently the seller knew
that the promissory notes did not exist, what if anything
would be required before the seller could make additional
sales to those same investors?
MR. KELLER:

Objection, same basis.
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THE COURT: Overruled.

You may answer.

THE WITNESS: When there is a material change
in the operation of the company, in most cases -- well,
what should happen is that an amendment should be made to
the prospectus for future offerees.

But al30, people who

have invested in the offering should be given a chance to
review the material change in the company and decide
whether or not they want to invest in that company.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) And will you tell the Court,

please, whether or not amending this type of document is
a common or uncommon practice.
A

It is very common.

Q

Do you review those amendments from time to

time that take place in the securities industry?
A

Yes.

Q

And I believe that you testified, Mr. Cook,

that you do not ordinarily review Private Placement
Memorandums, but you do so on occasion?
A

Yes.

Q

And have you had an opportunity to review that

document more than once?
A

Yes, in preparation for the testimony, yes.

Q

Let's say, Mr. Cook, that you had an

opportunity to review this Private Placement Memorandum
before it was used in sales. And let's say you knew the
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PHOTOGRAPHER:
THE COURT:
MR. GRIFFIN:
Q

Yes, I understand the rules.

You may proceed.
Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Griffin) Do you recollect the facts,

Mr. Cook?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not

those facts ought to be disclosed in an offering document
similar to that one?
A

Yes, I would consider that material information

that an investor would like to know.
Q
insiders.
A

You had talked earlier about compensation to
Does that fall in that category?
Yes, it is compensation but it also goes to

exactly what the general partners have at risk, whether
or not they have an incentive to put forth every effort
to make the operation successful.
Q

Now, assume also that you are examining a

Private Placement Memorandum, if you will, with regard to
a limited partnership.

And you uncover that the general

partner is actually not going to make the day-to-day
decisions in that limited partnership.

That will be

delegated to someone else to make the important decisions
and the day-to-day decisions.

Would you want that to be

disclosed as well?

B9

1

J

A

Yes.

Again, that would be very important; for

2

an investor to know.

3

investors in a limited partnership look to the general

4

partner for the operation, the success of the company.

5

And the general partner is probably the most important

6

part of the limited partnership.

7

partner is, in fact, not the true general partner, that

8

would be important for an investor to know.

9

I

Q

The limited partners, or the

And if that general

You said that you understood the role of Equity

10

I Terra, the investment manager in this particular limited

11

J partnership.

12

J

13

J says about Equity Terra.

14

I

15

J that you are looking at a limited partnership and a

16

1 Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an investment

A

Q

I have read the prospectus and I know what it

Let me put this question to you.

Again, assume

17

manager that was supposed to make sure that certain

18

criteria were fulfilled before loans were made from the

19

limited partnership funds.

20

the investment manager never met, never operated, never

21

J exercised his prerogative or made a recommendation, would

22

J you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure document

23
24
25

And assume, if you will, that

to investors?
MR. KELLER:

Objection.

Your Honor, the

hypothetical is irrelevant to this particular case.

I
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would go further if the Court would allow me.
THE COURT:

You may come to the bench.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel. )
THE COURT:
Q

Objection is overruled.

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, do you remember the

facts and the hypothetical situation?
A

Would you ask it again?

Q

Let's suppose you were examining the limited

partnership in which there is an investment manager that
will make certain recommendations as to how money is
going to be used from the limited partnership,
specifically regarding certain loan criteria.

And let's

assume also that the investment manager never functioned,
never made those recommendations and, in fact, ever met.
Would you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure
document to investors?
A

Yes, that would also be material.

It goes to

the essence of the operation and if there is a change in
what is disclosed to investors, that should be —

that

information should be in the prospectus to begin with and
an investor should be informed of that.
Q

And if there is a change that the seller

realizes later on after he has used the document
disclosing the investment manager will function, what is
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the proper way of dealing with that?
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

Objection, 702.
Overruled.

THE WITNESS:

Investors should be informed of

that change and given a chance to get out of the
investment.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Now, will you pick up again

State's Exhibit 41-S and can you turn to page 44.

I want

to make sure you are at the right location, Mr. Cook.
You see the paragraph on the page that begins
"Furthermore"?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you read that sentence to the jury?

A

"Furthermore, trust deeds and other instruments

of the Existing Projects, Three of which have a negative
equity or a loss, will be put into the Collateral Pool
with similar instruments from any new Projects to which
Note proceeds are loaned."
Q

Now, this sentence discloses that there are

three projects, three existing projects that have a
negative equity or loss; is that correct?
A

Yes.
MR. KELLER:

leading.

Objection, Your Honor, that is

That is counsel's interpretation.
THE COURT:

Sustained.
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Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, was there a way to

identify which of these projects are being referred to as
the negative equity or loss projects?
A

Yes.

Later on in the prospectus there is a

little more information in the projects.
Q

Will you turn back to the numbered page 70 in

the exhibit, and do you have that page?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you see section four, Commercial Club

Building?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you read the second and third paragraphs

in that section which are on page 71, beginning with the
words "The Commercial Club Building."
A

"The Commercial Club Building was purchased in

July of 1975, pursuant to purchase contract for
approximately $750,000. As of December 31, 1985 the
partnership had borrowed approximately $582,593 from
Existing Utah Lenders through the Utah Liquid Mortgage
Funds and $220,992 from Granada and Granada Limited
Partnership to provide funds for improvements and to make
payments on the purchase contract. There is a loan with
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. against the property
with an outstanding balance of $652,134 with interest at
the rate of 10 percent per annum and monthly payments of
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD.
Defendant claims that the trial committed reversible
error in refusing to give his requested instructions on "specific
intent to defraud" as an element of securities fraud.

This claim

is without merit.
M

[T]he framing of instructions lies in the trial

court's discretion."
(Utah 1988).

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266

"[T]he instructions should not incorrectly or

misleadingly state the material rules of law. . . . However,
beyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the
jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court."

State v. Alv, 782

P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Here, the trial court gave the following instruction
defining "willfully"11:
You are instructed that a person engages
in conduct intentionally or with intent or
willfully,
with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
Instruction No. 17 (R. 1312) (emphasis added).

That instruction

misstatements or omissions were material (see, e.g., R. 1289,
1609, 1610, 1611). See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989) ("Errors we label 'harmless' are errors which . . . are
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
11

The culpable mental state "willfully" applies to section
61-1-1(2), under which defendant was charged, through section 61-

• 34-

is nearly a verbatim recitation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(1990)f which defines "willfully" to mean the same thing as
"intentionally' or "with intent."

Thus, the instruction

accurately states the law, and, contrary to defendant's
contention, is not inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P. 2d
110, 111 (Utah 1976), which identifies the culpable mental state
for securities fraud as "intentionally."

Indeed, the court's

instruction is entirely consistent with an assertion defendant
makes twice in his brief:

"[T]he culpable mental state of

'willfully,' which is the culpable mental state required by
U.C.A. S 61-1-21, has already been defined under Utah law in
U.C.A. S 76-2-103(1) to mean 'intentionally.'"
at 64, 67.

Br. of Appellant

The instruction makes clear to the jury that it had

to find defendant willfully (as defined in section 76-2-103(1))
made an "untrue statement of a material fact or [willfully]
omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
[were] made, not misleading."

S 61-1-1(2).

Finally, defendant's proposed instruction used the
terms "specific intent" and "general intent" which are no longer
used in the current criminal code.
39, 43 (Utah 1987).

State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d

For this reason alone the court properly

rejected the proposed instruction and gave one which set forth
the statutory definition of the applicable culpable mental state.
See Ibid, (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing
to give the defendant's requested instruction on "specific
intent" as an essential element of rape).

-35-

And, insofar as

defendant argues that the trial court was required to instruct
the jury that in order to convict under section 61-1-1(2), it
would have to find that defendant willfully made a misstatement
of a material fact with the intent
incorrect.

to defraud,

that argument is

Section 61-1-1(2) deals only with a willful

misstatement or omission of a material fact; it does not contain
language that would give rise to the additional element of
"intent to defraud."

See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 175

Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08, appeal denied, 433 Mich.
895 (1990); State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 52527 (1982).
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
not giving defendant's requested instruction and giving
Instruction No. 17 instead.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN NOT GIVING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION THAT DEFINED "MATERIAL FACT" AND
GIVING AN ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTION.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to give a correct definition of "material fact."

He claims that

the court did not, as it indicated, give in substance his
requested instruction on the subject.

This assignment of error

is without merit.
As noted above, "the framing of instructions lies in
the trial judge's discretion."

Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. So

long as they accurately state the law, the instuctions' precise
wording and specificity is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.

Alv, 782 P.2d at 550.

It is not entirely clear why

